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This paper attempts to measure the reaction of monetary policy to the stock
market. We apply the procedure of Rigobon and Sack (2003) to identify and
estimate a VAR in the presence of heteroskedasticity. This procedure fully takes
into account the endogeneity of interest rates and stock returns that is ignored in
the traditional VAR literature. We ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant reaction in the
US and the UK. However, since the end of the 1990s, in a period of large stock
market ￿ uctuations, this reaction declines in the US and disappears in the UK. In
Japan and the EU, we do not ￿nd any reaction. We provide evidence that the lower
response to stock prices in the last part of the sample in the US is compensated
by a higher response to real estate prices.
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While the main concern of central bankers, the in￿ ation rate, is now low and stable
in the main developed economies, ￿nancial instability has become one of the most
discussed issues in the press and in the academic literature. Borio and Lowe
(2002) document two boom-bust cycles in asset prices, one from the mid-1980s to
early 1990s, the other from the end of the 1990s to 2003. These cycles appear to be
growing in amplitude and length and are characterized by equity prices being more
volatile than commercial and residential real estate prices. Large swings have been
associated with strains in the ￿nancial sector and in the real economy. Important
recessions have been experienced after the two cycles described above, in particular
in Japan but also in many other countries (Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994)).
Developments in the ￿nancial markets have become increasingly important
also for central banks. In the theoretical literature the most discussed policy is-
sue is whether central banks should include asset prices in their reaction function.
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that price stability is the only objective of a
central bank and asset prices have to be taken into account only as long as they
signal changes in expected in￿ ation. Simulations of various kinds of monetary
policy rules (including or not including asset prices) in a new Keynesian model
with nominal rigidities and ￿nancial accelerator show that the most stabilizing
rule is one that responds strongly to in￿ ation but does not react to asset price
variations. The authors argue that the response to asset prices has destabilizing
e⁄ects because it is almost impossible to know whether a change in asset prices
is due to fundamental factors or not. These claims have not stood unchallenged.
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhawani (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2002),
Akram and Eithreim (2008), Akram, B￿rdsen and Eithreim (2006) among oth-
ers provide examples where a more proactive policy has stabilizing e⁄ects on the
economy. Iacoviello (2005), on the other hand, shows that reacting to real estate
in￿ ation causes little gain in terms of in￿ ation and output volatility. The optimal
coe¢ cient in the reaction function is around 0.1 (for recent evidence on this issue
in an estimated model see Finocchiaro and Queijo von Heideken (2007)).
1A second strand of the literature takes a positive perspective and aims at eval-
uating empirically the impact of asset prices on interest rates in di⁄erent countries
over the last twenty years. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) extend the approach pro-
posed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998 and 2000) and estimate a forward looking
extended policy rule where the interest rate also responds to stock returns. They
￿nd that the response is negative but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for the
United States and Japan. They take into account the endogeneity of stock returns
instrumenting for the change in stock prices with lags of macroeconomic variables
and stock returns. Re￿ning the same methodology, Chadha, Sarno and Valente
(2004) ￿nd di⁄erent results. They carefully check the quality of the instruments
and use an adjusted labor share as the appropriate, and theoretically grounded,
proxy for the output gap. Over the period 1979-2000, they discover a positive and
signi￿cant response in the US and the UK whereas they ￿nd no reaction in Japan.
Rigobon and Sack (RS) (2003) challenge the Bernanke-Gertler (2000) results
arguing that the endogeneity issue is not considered properly. They advocate that
it is hard to conceive any instrument which is highly correlated with changes in
stock prices without a⁄ecting changes in the interest rate. Thus, in their opinion,
this kind of regression uses weak instruments leading to biased estimates. RS
(2003) aim at measuring the reaction of monetary policy to stock prices using a
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. Following Rigobon (2003), they fully take
into account the endogeneity issue by using an appropriate identi￿cation technique
based on heteroskedasticity present in daily data. Unlike Bernanke and Gertler
(2000), they estimate a positive and signi￿cant reaction of monetary policy to the
stock market in the US over the period 1985-1999. Bohl, Siklos and Werner (2007)
use the same model for Germany and ￿nd a reaction that is not signi￿cant in the
period 1985-1999.
In this paper we test power and weaknesses of the RS procedure by applying
it to di⁄erent countries and di⁄erent sample periods. Moreover, since we consider
the same countries as Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004), our results can be useful
to compare identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity and estimation of Taylor rules
by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a cross-country dimension. More
2speci￿cally, the ￿rst objective of our paper is to measure the impact of stock
prices on interest rates until 2006 in the US, checking whether there is a di⁄erent
reaction in di⁄erent subperiods. Our second goal is to extend the analysis to other
industrialized countries like the UK, Japan and the EU.
Our most important result concerns the US. We con￿rm the positive and sig-
ni￿cant response of interest rates found by RS (2003). However, our estimates
indicate a lower reaction when we extend the sample. Following a 10% increase
in the asset market index, the interest rate increases by 23 basis points over the
period 1985-1995 and by only 6 basis points over the period 1996-2006. Both
estimates are signi￿cant at the 95% level. While the ￿rst part of the sample is
characterized by a relatively smooth growth of the stock market index, the second
part exhibits two large boom-bust cycles. Hence, we ￿nd a lower reaction in a
period of ￿nancial instability.
We provide a tentative interpretation for the lower response in the second part
of the sample that is related to the wealth e⁄ect of asset prices on aggregate
demand. RS (2003) argue that the estimated response is compatible with the
wealth e⁄ect of stock prices on aggregate consumption. According to this view, the
central bank reacts indirectly to stock prices because of their e⁄ects on aggregate
demand. A lower reaction in the second part of the sample could re￿ ect a lower
relative importance of stock wealth, compared, for example, to real estate wealth.
To test this conjecture we estimate the same model with REIT data which is
a stock market index of companies active in the real estate sector. Consistent
with our conjecture, we show that the response to our proxy for house prices is not
signi￿cant in the ￿rst part of the sample whereas it becomes positive and signi￿cant
in the second part of the sample. Quantitatively, the estimated response is very
similar to the estimated response to stock prices. Hence, we conclude that the
lower response to stock prices is compensated by a higher response to real estate
prices. Interestingly, recent empirical evidence supports the importance of the
wealth e⁄ect coming from the housing sector. Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005),
Ludwig and Slłk (2004), Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek (2006) among others ￿nd
that the real estate wealth e⁄ect is increasing over time and higher than the stock
3market wealth e⁄ect.
Turning to the second goal of our paper, we show that the international evi-
dence is relatively di⁄erent from the evidence from the US. We do not ￿nd any
reaction in the EU or Japan, either to stock prices or to the real estate proxy.
In the UK, we only ￿nd a signi￿cant response to stock prices in the ￿rst part of
the sample and no response to REIT data. According to our estimates, central
banks in the EU, Japan and the UK pay less attention to asset prices. Consistent
with empirical evidence provided in Altissimo et al. (2005) and with central bank
speeches (Trichet (2002)), a possible explanation is that the wealth e⁄ect coming
from asset prices is lower outside the US. Hence, the indirect reaction of monetary
policy is lower.
Finally, this paper reconciles the result of Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004)
(GMM estimation of monetary policy reaction functions) with the results of RS
(2003) (identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity). Although the two methodolo-
gies are very di⁄erent, we ￿nd exactly the same results when we use the RS
methodology on the sample period used by Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004).
This equivalence result strengthens the GMM approach, showing that the issue of
endogeneity can be dealt with appropriately.
Nonetheless, identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity appears to be the only
powerful tool to obtain reliable estimates in short samples. Using quarterly data,
the approach based on GMM cannot disentangle the low or inexistent response of
interest rates to stock prices in the recent years. The RS procedure can detect this
new and interesting result because it exploits the enormous amount of information
provided by daily data and, hence, can be used for much shorter samples.
This paper has the following structure. In section 2 we present the RS method-
ology. In section 3 we extend the evidence for the US and we discuss our interpreta-
tion. In section 4 we provide a cross-country analysis and in section 5 we compare
our results with alternative methodologies. Concluding remarks are contained in
section 6.
42 The Rigobon and Sack￿ s procedure1
VAR models are the most frequently used tool to measure the interactions between
macroeconomic variables. As we are interested in interest rates and stock prices,

















where it is the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, st are stock returns, A
is a 2 ￿ 2 matrix that describes contemporaneous relations among the variables,
c(L) is a ￿nite order lag polynomial, "t and ￿t are structural disturbances. B is a
2 ￿ 2 matrix in which non zero o⁄-diagonal elements allow some shocks to a⁄ect
both endogenous variables.
We use the three-month Treasury bill rate rather than the federal funds rate.
While the federal funds rate is changed every six weeks or so, the three month
Treasury bill rate adjusts daily, re￿ ecting expectations of future variations in the
federal funds rate, and is closely monitored by the central bank. RS (2003) and
Bohl, Siklos and Werner (2007) carefully motivate this choice. In this paper we
follow the literature to facilitate results comparability.
The usual assumptions to achieve identi￿cation in this kind of model are to
impose a triangular form to matrix A (Cholesky decomposition) and a diagonal
structure to matrix B. In this way the model is exactly identi￿ed. But a triangular
matrix A implies that one of the two variables does not react contemporaneously
to the other. This assumption, which is reasonable in other contexts, is clearly
inappropriate in this case. In our application, each shock to one of the variables
has an immediate e⁄ect on the other in the ￿nancial markets.
RS do not impose a triangular structure on matrix A and build an identi￿cation
procedure relying on the heteroskedasticity that is present in the data and that
usually is not considered in VAR studies. In ￿gure 1, we represent the thirty-day
rolling volatility of daily changes in the stock market index and daily changes in
1This section draws heavily on Rigobon and Sack (2003).
5the interest rate in the US. There are rich patterns that highlight the importance
of modelling heteroskedasticity. We observe that shifts in volatility a⁄ect the
correlation between interest rates and stock returns. In ￿gure 1, we see that
this correlation is negative most of the time but becomes positive when stock
market volatility is high. The RS procedure exploits these shifts in covariance
to identify the model without imposing inappropriate exclusion restrictions (as
in the traditional approach). It is crucial to use daily data to exploit fully the
heteroskedasticity present in the data. In fact, heteroskedasticity diminishes a lot
in lower frequency data.
Realizations of interest rates and stock returns can be seen as the intersection
between two schedules. The ￿rst is the reaction function of asset prices to changes
in the interest rate (supposed to be downward sloping because an increase in the
interest rate lowers the discounted value of future dividends, i.e. the value of
the asset). The second is the reaction of the interest rate to the evolution of
the stock market. The objective of the procedure is to estimate the slope of this
second schedule. Because of heteroskedasticity, endogeneity and unobservability
of a common shock zt, introduced below, OLS estimates are biased. Thus, we look
for a variable (an instrument) that shifts the stock market curve without a⁄ecting
the monetary policy response. An increase in the variance of the stock market
shock changes the covariance between stock returns and the interest rate and this
change plays the role of an instrument.
RS estimate the following VAR:
it = ￿st + ￿xt + ￿zt + "t
st = ￿it + ￿xt + zt + ￿t
where it is the three-month interest rate (Tbill), st is the daily return on the
S&P 500 index, xt includes 5 lags of the two endogenous variables and some
macroeconomic shocks (measured as monthly releases of some macro indicators
and subtracting the value expected by market participants, see RS (2003)), and zt
6represents some unobserved shocks a⁄ecting both it and st. The common shock
takes into account any macroeconomic shock not included in xt or shifts in risk
preferences of the agents.2 "t is a monetary policy shock, ￿t is a stock market
shock.
The structure of the model is quite rich, but our objective is very simple. We
want to estimate the coe¢ cient ￿ that measures the response of the interest rate
to the stock market return.
The assumption on the correlation structure of the shocks is the following: the
shocks "t and ￿t and the unobserved shock zt are supposed to be orthogonal and
at this stage all three can be heteroskedastic. Note that ortoghonality of "t and
￿t does not imply that disturbances are uncorrelated: In fact, the presence of zt
induces correlation.





















This system cannot be estimated directly, because of the endogeneity problem






















































































In the VAR literature, it is common practice to recover the estimates of struc-
tural form parameters from reduced form residuals. Given the structure of cor-
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By estimating the model in reduced form, we obtain a consistent estimate for
the covariance matrix of reduced form residuals. Unfortunately, the covariance
matrix provides only three moments ￿11;￿12;￿22; which are not enough to achieve
identi￿cation. The maximum number of parameters that can be identi￿ed is three,
but in matrix ￿ we have six unknowns: ￿;￿;￿;￿2
z;￿2
￿;￿2
". Hence, we do not have
enough restrictions to recover the structural form parameters.
Still, heteroskedasticity can help in our task if we can identify di⁄erent regimes
for the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals. The additional regimes
provide new restrictions and may enable us to identify the parameters of the
structural form. Unfortunately, for each new regime indexed by the subscript




ertheless, if we assume that the monetary policy shock " is homoskedastic (thus
￿2
" is constant across regimes), we add three equations and only two unknowns











but this is enough to achieve partial iden-
ti￿cation, and in particular we can estimate the parameter ￿.
The assumption that ￿2
" is constant is not very restrictive because it does not
imply that it is homoskedastic. In fact, the variance of the interest rate is also
composed of ￿2
i;z and ￿2
i;￿ which change through time. The other essential assump-
tion to achieve identi￿cation is that the parameters ￿;￿ and ￿ are constant across
regimes. This is common practice in the VAR literature, also when heteroskedas-
ticity is not considered.
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In appendix B, we show that with three regimes one solution of the following
quadratic equation is a consistent estimator for ￿:
a￿
2 ￿ b￿ + c = 0
where:3
a = ￿￿31;22￿￿21;12 ￿ ￿￿21;22￿￿31;12
b = ￿￿31;22￿￿21;11 ￿ ￿￿21;22￿￿31;11
c = ￿￿31;12￿￿21;11 ￿ ￿￿21;12￿￿31;11
With four regimes. we have overidentifying restrictions that allow us to esti-
mate ￿ by GMM.
A nice feature of this model is that many assumptions are testable. In fact, if
the model is correctly speci￿ed we should ￿nd the same results for ￿ under any
3￿￿31;22 is the (2,2) element of matrix ￿￿31. ￿￿31 = ￿3 ￿ ￿1.
9three regimes, since the parameter ￿ is supposed to be constant in the sample
period. If not, the parameters are unstable across regimes, the assumption of
homoskedasticity for the monetary policy shock is not correct or there are non
linearities that are not captured in the Rigobon and Sack￿ s formulation.
Thus far, we have proved that with at least three regimes we are able to con-
sistently estimate the parameter ￿. To determine the regimes, we estimate the
VAR (1) in reduced form and take the residuals. The heteroskedasticity of the
shocks allows us to identify four regimes: regime 1 where both shocks have low
volatility, regime 2 where the interest rate shock has low volatility and the stock
market shock has high volatility, regime 3 where both shocks have high volatility,
regime 4 where the interest rate shock has high volatility and the stock market
shock has low volatility. We split the observations into the four regimes according
to the following criterion: one observation is considered to have high variance if the
thirty-day rolling variance of the residual is more than one standard deviation over
the average of the series (lim=1 in our notation).4 RS admit that this approach is
arbitrary, but at least two arguments can justify this choice:
1) As shown in Rigobon (2003), the estimates are consistent even if the regimes
are badly speci￿ed. The estimates are not consistent only if the misspeci￿cation
is so large that the system fails the following order condition:5
￿11;i￿12;j ￿ ￿11;j￿12;i 6= 0
for regimes i and j with i 6= j.
This condition has an intuitive explanation. It fails when two covariance ma-
trices are proportional, i.e. relative variances are constant across regimes. In this
case, some moment conditions are not independent and heteroskedasticity cannot
be helpful (for a proof of this result and more details see Rigobon (2003)).6
4It can happen that, using this criterion, very few observations enter the high volatility
regimes. In these cases, we will lower the window to 0.75 of a standard deviation or to one-half
of a standard deviation (lim=0.75 or lim=0.5).
5In this case, the parameters are not even identi￿ed because this condition is the equivalent of
the rank condition that is tested in the identi￿cation literature once the order condition (number
of equations equal to number of unknowns to achieve just-identi￿cation) is satis￿ed.
6Rigobon (2003) proves that the estimates are consistent also when the windows of the het-
102) The same criterion is largely used in the literature to identify periods of
excessive volatility in asset markets (Bordo and Jeanne (2002)).
The last step is to compute the distributions of the estimated coe¢ cients. The
distributions are calculated by bootstrap. Residuals are supposed to be normal
with mean zero and variance ￿i for each regime. We simulate 1000 draws for each
￿i. For each covariance matrix, we estimate ￿ using di⁄erent subsets of regimes.
In the end, we obtain 1000 estimates and we are able to compute the distributions.
3 The US: 1985-2006
In this section, we reproduce the results of RS for the US and we extend their
analysis until 2006. We then suggest some possible interpretations and we discuss
some issues in the speci￿cation of the model.
3.1 Results
In our ￿rst experiment, we replicate the results of RS (2003). The sample period
is January 1985-December 1999 and the data are daily.7
RS (2003) include in the variable xt some observable macroeconomic shocks
measured as the di⁄erence between the released value and the expected value
of ￿ve monthly macroeconomic indicators: the consumer price index (CPI), the
National Association of Purchasing Managers survey (NAPM), non-farm payrolls
(NEPAY), the core producer index (PPI) and retail sales (RETL). The role of
these shocks in the model is negligible and in fact we are even able to reproduce
the results for the US without them.8 In our speci￿cation, the variable xt only
consists of 5 lags of the two endogenous variables.
eroskedasticity are wrongly speci￿ed (but the number of regimes is correct) and when there are
more regimes in the data than the ones assumed in the model. Of course, if the regimes are
badly speci￿ed the di⁄erences across regimes are lower and the power of the model is reduced.
7All the data are taken from Datastream.
8We investigate this issue more deeply in section 4.3.
11The results (shown in table 1) are consistent with the assumptions of the model.
The estimates of the coe¢ cient ￿ are almost identical across regimes and quite
precise.
Table 1: Estimates for the US, 1985-1999
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
all 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0183 0.0180 0.0185 0.0177 0.0191
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0457 0.0093 0.0055 0.0055 0.0058
Median of distribution 0.0185 0.0186 0.0185 0.0178 0.0192
Mass below zero 0.7% 2.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Our results are very similar to the ones found by RS (2003), which we present
in table 2. We observe minor di⁄erences in the estimates but larger di⁄erences in
the standard deviations under regimes 1,3,4, 2,3,4 and 1,2,3,4. We can conclude
that the inclusion of monthly macroeconomic shocks plays very little role in the
RS results. Using di⁄erent subsets of regimes, we obtain an estimate of 0.017-
0.018 with a standard error of 0.005 (except in one case where the standard error
is bigger because of seven outliers with large negative values). On average, our
speci￿cation achieves more stable and precise results.
The reader can notice that the quality of estimates involving both regimes 3
and 4 in the RS speci￿cation is signi￿cantly worse than the others. In regimes 3
and 4, the residuals in the interest rate equation exhibit high volatility. Appar-
ently, regimes with high stock market volatility are more useful for identifying the
parameters. This fact is con￿rmed in all the following tables. We provide extensive
sensitivity analysis in appendixes A and C.
12Table 2: Results of Rigobon and Sack (2003), the US 1985-1999
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0210 0.0214 0.0210 0.0273 0.1402
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0052 0.0058 0.0052 0.314 3.8122
Median of distribution 0.0208 0.0217 0.0208 0.0169 0.0191
Mass below zero 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 1.4%
The major result of the RS paper is that by employing an appropriate identi-
￿cation procedure, the reaction of monetary policy to stock prices movements is
positive and signi￿cant. A point estimate of 0.018 means that a 10% rise in the
S&P 500 index increases the three-month interest rate by 18 basis points. RS ar-
gue that this result is very plausible and corresponds to the impact of stock prices
on aggregate demand, mainly through the wealth e⁄ect on consumption.
The RS sample ends in December 1999. Since more data are available, we
extend the analysis until April 2006. The results shown in table 3 are considerably
di⁄erent from the evidence provided above:
Table 3: Estimates for the US, 1985-2006
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0066 0.0057 0.0072 0.0177 0.0189
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0025 0.0029 0.0023 0.0051 0.0054
Mass below zero 0.7% 2.5% 0.1% 0% 0%
Even though all ￿ve estimates are still positive and signi￿cant, according to
three of them, the monetary policy reaction is consistently lower (around 6 basis
points following a 10% increase of the stock market index).9
Hence, we ￿nd a considerable instability in the estimates over the period 1985-
2006. Our conjecture is that the assumption of constant parameters over the
9The di⁄erences in the estimates are statistically di⁄erent from zero at a 95% level in three
cases out of four (see table C3 in appendix C).
13sample is violated. A second possible reason is the violation of the homoskedastic-
ity assumption on ￿". To test our conjecture, we split our large sample of twenty
years of daily data in December 1995. Thus, the two sub-samples have approxi-
mately the same size. We believe that our choice is sensible because stock market
indexes exhibit a smooth growth over the ￿rst part of the sample and a series of
boom and bust cycles in the second part.10
Results in tables 4 and 5 con￿rm a considerable di⁄erence in the estimates over
the two sub-samples. The response is lower in the second part of the sample.
Table 4: Estimates for the US, 1985-1995 lim=0.5
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0230 0.0237 0.0020 0.0199 0.0204
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0057 0.0060 0.0723 0.0045 0.0046
Mass below zero 0.1% 0% 58% 0% 0%
Table 5: Estimates for the US, 1996-2006 lim=1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0063 0.0062 0.0063 0.0113 0.0087
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0990 0.0303
Mass below zero 0% 0.1% 0% 36.7% 36.5%
The results for the period 1985-1995 con￿rm a positive and signi￿cant reaction.
Given the estimates for the period 1985-1999, this is not surprising. The results
are extremely stable and precise across regimes with the considerable exception of
the estimate under regimes 1,2,4. A possible explanation is that we found very
10Of course, several econometric techniques could be used to identify precisely the date of a
possible structural break. However, we think that splitting the sample at the end of 1995 is a
simple device to separate two periods that look meaningfully di⁄erent, at least from an economic
point of view.
14few observations in regime 2 in this sample period.11 RS locate residuals in the
high volatility regime if the observation is at least one standard deviation over
the average of the series (lim=1 in our notation). Our result above is referred
to as one-half of a standard deviation (lim=0.5) because otherwise we would ￿nd
even fewer observations in regime 2. This analysis shows that the results for the
period 1985-1999 are driven by the structure of heteroskedasticity that is especially
favorable over this period. In particular, many observations belonging to regime
2 are located in the period 1996-1999. Hence, a limitation of the procedure that
otherwise works well is that in some cases it is di¢ cult to have enough observations
in all the four regimes to perform the estimation.
For the period 1996-2006 (table 5) we do not ￿nd any speci￿c reaction to the
huge swings in the stock market index. Instead, we observe a sizeable decline in
the response of the interest rate.
In the period 1996-2006, there are three distinct phases corresponding to the
huge stock market boom (January 1996-September 2000), the following bust (Sep-
tember 2000-March 2003) and the subsequent recovery (March 2003-April 2006).
We believe that it is interesting to discover whether the interest rate response is
the same in the boom and in the bust phases of the cycle. In table 6, we show
the statistics for the estimate based on all four regimes in the three subperiods
described above:
Table 6: Estimates for the US
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
1996-2000 2000-2003 2003-2006
Mean of distribution 0.0078 0.0076 0.0067
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0040 0.0031 0.0069
Median of distribution 0.0076 0.0075 0.0060
Mass below zero 1.8% 0.4% 14.7%
The reaction does not change across the three subperiods. According to our
estimates, the response of the three-month interest rate is the same in the boom
11See table C4 in appendix C.
15and in the bust phase of the stock market cycle. The response is still positive
and signi￿cant (at least up to 2003), but it is low when compared to the period
1985-1995.
3.2 Interpretations
According to our estimates, at the end of the 1990s something changed in the
relationship between stock prices and the three-month interest rate. Since this
interest rate re￿ ects near term expectations of future monetary policy, something
also changed in the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices.
Even though recent large stock market swings had no signi￿cant impact on CPI
in￿ ation (moreover, Stock and Watson (2003) show that asset prices have low and
unstable forecasting power for CPI in￿ ation), there is increasing empirical evidence
pointing to a signi￿cant impact of asset price swings on aggregate demand through
a wealth e⁄ect on consumption, a Tobin￿ s Q and ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects on
investment (see Maki and Palumbo (2001) among many others). Hence, if a lower
forecasting power for in￿ ation would justify a lower response to asset prices, a
larger stock market wealth e⁄ect would call for a higher response.
Our interpretation is that the lower reaction can re￿ ect the growing impact
of other forms of wealth on aggregate demand, in particular housing wealth. We
conjecture that a lower impact of stock prices on aggregate demand can be com-
pensated by a higher response to real estate prices. This reasoning would imply
that the monetary policy authority has devoted more attention to developments
in the housing market rather than the stock market. The recent boom in the real
estate market can reconcile a decrease in the marginal propensity to consume out
of ￿nancial wealth and an increase in the marginal propensity to consume out of
real wealth (real estate). To test this conjecture, we can use our model and mea-
sure the reaction to house prices. Obviously, daily data on house prices are not
available. Nevertheless, a proxy exists which in our opinion can provide meaning-
ful results: the REIT index. It includes speci￿c publicly traded securities of real
estate trusts and real estate operating companies. Data are daily and thus are a
reliable indicator of the high frequency evolution in the real estate market.
16We estimate the model since the beginning of the 1990s, because the REIT
series starts at that time. We report the estimates for the periods 1990-1996 and
1996-2006, as we did for stock prices:
Table 7: Estimates for the US, REIT Data, 1990-1995 lim=1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0009 0.0004 0.0011 0.0266 0.0250
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0057 0.0063 0.0055 0.0190 0.0164
Mass below zero 44.1% 46.3% 41.4% 5.1% 4.8%
Table 8: Estimates for the US, REIT Data, 1996-2006 lim=1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0046 0.0043 0.0050 0.0173 0.0168
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0030 0.0031 0.0029 0.0165 0.0163
Mass below zero 8.7% 4.9% 6.4% 12.8% 21.3%
We remark that the estimate is not signi￿cant in the ￿rst part of the sample,
whereas it becomes signi￿cant at the 90 % level in the second part of the sample.
Thus, while the reaction to stock prices has declined over time, the reaction to
house prices has followed the opposite pattern. Pushing the argument further,
this result is consistent with an increase in the wealth e⁄ect of non-￿nancial assets
and with an increase in the importance of house prices in the monetary policy
strategy.
These results con￿rm our conjecture that the lower response to stock prices is
accompanied by a higher response to real estate prices. According to the ￿nancial
literature (Paiella (2004) and Altissimo et al: (2005) among others), di⁄erent assets
are not necessarily fungible. Certain assets are more appropriate to use for current
expenditure, others for long-term savings or for bequest. Wealth e⁄ects can thus
17di⁄er across assets and can be in￿ uenced by shifts in household preferences and
portfolios. Our results can thus re￿ ect a more relevant macroeconomic impact of
real estate prices and a lower relative impact of stock prices.
The evidence provided above is consistent with extensive recent literature on
the housing wealth e⁄ect. Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) ￿nd that the housing
wealth e⁄ect is positive and signi￿cant with an elasticity ranging from 0.11 to 0.17.
This e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cantly higher than the ￿nancial wealth e⁄ect, which
is not statistically di⁄erent from zero in their estimates. Interestingly, from their
tables we discover that not only does housing wealth have a more important e⁄ect
than stock market wealth, but this e⁄ect is also increasing over time. They argue
convincingly that ￿scal reforms and deregulation in the mortgage markets have
favored home equity loans. Carroll, Slacalek and Otsuka (2006) also ￿nd that the
housing wealth e⁄ect is substantially larger than the stock market wealth e⁄ect.
They estimate the long-run marginal propensities to consume out of housing wealth
to be 0.09 for housing and out of stock market wealth to be 0.04. Ludwig and Slłk
(2004) also ￿nd that the housing wealth e⁄ect is signi￿cantly increasing over time
in the OECD countries, whereas it is unclear whether the housing wealth e⁄ect is
larger than the stock market wealth e⁄ect.
Speeches from members of the Federal Reserve Board (Greenspan (2001) among
others) con￿rm that house prices have gained attention in the formulation of
the monetary policy strategy. Greenspan (2001) states clearly that the marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth might be higher than the marginal
propensity to consume out of stock market wealth. Hence, our results can re￿ ect
an evolution in the monetary policy strategy over the last ten years.
Interestingly, and unlike the case for asset prices, we discover di⁄erent behavior
in the very last part of the sample:
18Table 9: Estimates for the US, REIT Data
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
1996-2000 2000-2003 2003-2006
Mean of distribution 0.0116 0.0096 -0.0008
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0058 0.0061 0.0053
Mass below zero 2.2% 4.2% 59.6%
Surprisingly, when the increase in real estate prices accelerates (2003-2006), we
detect a sudden stop in the interest rate response.
3.3 The role of macroeconomic shocks
One possible criticism to the speci￿cation of our model is that it is excessively
simple. A simple bivariate VAR can miss important information coming from
other macroeconomic variables a⁄ecting at the same time the interest rate and the
stock market index.
We defend our choice on the basis of three arguments:
1) RS (2003) include some measures of macroeconomic shocks in their baseline
speci￿cation. We have shown above that the presence of these shocks does not
a⁄ect the results, since we are able to closely reproduce the RS results.
2) We think that the inclusion of monthly macroeconomic shocks in a model
with daily data is questionable. We propose a speci￿cation including as shocks
daily variations in the trade weighted exchange rate and in the oil price index.
These shocks have limited e⁄ects on the estimates, as can be seen in tables A1 to
A5 in appendix A.
3) The presence of the unobservable common shock zt, in our opinion, takes
into account to a large extent all the possible shocks driving interest rates and
stock prices. Identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity heavily relies on the com-
mon shocks and, in fact, when the common shock is excluded, the results worsen
signi￿cantly. As an example, we report the estimates for the two sub-samples
excluding the common shock:12
12Without common shocks only two regimes are enough to identify ￿.
19Table 10: Estimates for the US, 1985-1995 lim=1, no Common Shock
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
1,2 1,3 1,4 all
Mean of distribution 0.3051 0.0259 0.0052 0.0178
Std. dev. of distribution 3.4414 0.0065 0.0027 0.0083
Mass below zero 5.4% 0% 2.6% 3.1%
Table 11: Estimates for the US, 1996-2006, no Common Shock
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
1,2 1,3 1,4 all
Mean of distribution 0.0083 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0045
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0026 0.0024 0.0017 0.0017
Mass below zero 0% 61.6% 42% 0.3%
Comparing these results with tables 4 and 5, we see that the common shock is
essential and it is likely to capture dynamics induced by omitted macroeconomic
shocks.
Of course, although the presence of the common shock is relevant, we are
careful in the interpretation of our coe¢ cient ￿. It can re￿ ect any direct or indirect
reaction to stock prices, but it can also be in￿ uenced by other factors we do not
successfully control for.
4 Results for the UK, the EU and Japan
In this section we estimate our model with data for the UK, the EU and Japan.
4.1 The UK
We split the sample in January 1996, as we did for the US. In this way we can
compare the behavior of the Bank of England to the Federal Reserve in the two
20subperiods. The FTSE index, like the S&P, behaves relatively smoothly in the
￿rst sample and is subject to a big boom-bust cycle in the second sample.
The results for the period 1985-1995 are presented in table 12:
Table 12: Estimates for the UK 1985-1995 lim=0.75
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0157 0.0162 0.0154 0.0026 0.0017
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0071 0.0075 0.0069 0.0204 0.0174
Mass below zero 1.4% 1.6% 1.5% 46.2% 46.8%
The estimate of ￿ is around 0.015, meaning that an increase of 10% in the
stock market index causes an increase in the three-month interest rate of 15 basis
points. The estimated coe¢ cient appears to be of the same order of magnitude as
the one estimated for the US. Changes in the window to select the regimes a⁄ect
critically the two estimates based on regimes 3 and 4 together. Nonetheless, the
estimate that exploits all the four regimes is relatively stable as can be seen in
table A3 in appendix A.
In the second part of our sample (January 1996-April 2006), the estimates of
￿ are negative and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (table 13).
Table 13: Estimates for the UK 1996-2006 lim. 1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
All 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0044 -0.0034
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0237 0.00268
Mass below zero 56.1% 56.2% 54.8% 58.4% 56.7%
The results are very sharp. In the second part of the sample, the interest
rate did not react at all to stock prices. Hence, according to our estimates, while
the Federal Reserve maintained a positive and signi￿cant reaction in the second
period, the Bank of England ignored stock prices.
21In the case of the UK, we also analyze house prices, like in the US case. How-
ever, we do not identify any reaction to house prices, as shown in table A6 in
appendix A.
4.2 The EU
We now present the results for the EU. The sample period is January 1999-April
2006:
Table 14: Estimates for the EU 1999-2006 lim.1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
all 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution -0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0062 0.0063
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0193 0.0006 0.0006 0.0070 0.0086
Mass below zero 18.9% 19.5% 18.4% 17.6% 18%
The ECB reaction turns out to be not signi￿cant. The estimates are robust to
changes in the criteria to select the regimes and to the introduction of macroeco-
nomic shocks (see table A5 in appendix A).
The size of the sample is smaller than for the other countries, due to the intro-
duction of the euro in 1999, but is su¢ cient to derive some evidence on European
monetary policy. In 2002, Governor Trichet said explicitly that ￿ it is not oppor-
tune to introduce asset prices in the central bank￿ s reaction function￿ and our
result con￿rms this attitude.13 A topic of discussion is whether we should ￿nd
some sign of indirect reaction. Governor Trichet recognizes that recent changes
in asset prices have in￿ uenced private spending more than past swings because of
the more widespread stock ownership in a number of industrialized countries. He
states, however, that this impact is still low compared to the US. And in fact our
results do not show any sign of indirect reaction in the last seven years.
Also in the EU we do not ￿nd any reaction to house prices (see table A6 in
appendix A).
13Speech available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/instit/telechar/discours/sp230402.pdf
22All these results are consistent with the recent evidence provided in Paiella
(2004) and Altissimo et al: (2005) showing that the wealth e⁄ect, coming either
from stock prices or from housing, seems to be extremely low in Europe.
4.3 Japan
The case of Japan is di¢ cult to analyze because the monetary policy strategy has
changed several times in the last twenty years. During the 1980s monetary policy
was strongly oriented to the stabilization of the exchange rate. During the 1990s
the Bank of Japan was forced to change its strategy many times to ￿ght against the
zero interest rate bound. Therefore, the assumptions of constant coe¢ cients and
homoskedastic monetary policy shocks seem too strong. And in fact, although we
have run many regressions over several sample periods, changing the speci￿cation
of the model and the frequency of the data, and using many interest rates, we have
always found unstable results. It is the case for the whole period (1985-2006), for
the bubble period (1985-1990) and also for the liquidity trap period (1996-2005).
Considering that after 1996 the Bank of Japan could not lower the interest rate
because this was already close to zero, we show estimates for the period 1991-1996
in table 15. We ￿nd evidence of no reaction:
Table 15: Estimates for Japan 1991-1996 lim.1
Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes Regimes
all 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4
Mean of distribution 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0060 -0.0085
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0616 0.0085
Mass below zero 35.5% 42.4% 29.3% 66.2% 86.7%
The case of Japan shows that the RS procedure cannot always provide mean-
ingful estimates. Most likely, several shifts in the monetary policy stance violate
the assumption of homoskedastic monetary policy shocks.
235 GMM or identi￿cation through heteroskedas-
ticity?
According to RS (2003), identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity improves the
existing literature because it can deal appropriately with the endogeneity prob-
lem between interest rates and stock prices. RS show that extended Taylor rules
estimated by GMM deliver responses that are not statistically signi￿cant (as in
Bernanke and Gertler (2000)) and they argue that this is due to weak instruments.
However, Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004), using the same methodology, ￿nd a
signi￿cant response of the interest rate to stock price movements.
Estimating our model in sample periods as close as possible to Chadha, Sarno
and Valente (2004), we ￿nd very similar results, as can be seen in table 16:14
Table 16: Comparison to Chadha et al. (2004)








The two sets of estimates are almost indistinguishable. Thus, our work seems
to reconcile the two approaches. A careful choice of the instruments and a theo-
retically grounded measure of the output gap (as in Chadha, Sarno and Valente
(2004)) can correct for the endogeneity bias emphasized by RS (2003).
Nevertheless, the fact that extended Taylor rules are able to provide signi￿-
cant estimates does not mean that identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity be-
comes less useful. On the contrary, our results show that the RS procedure is
14Standard errors are in parenthesis. Our sample period is 1985-2000 for the UK and the US
and 1991-1996 for Japan.
24extremely powerful. Using identi￿cation through heteroskedasticity, we can es-
timate the model in very short samples (only few years) and obtain meaningful
results, whereas the Taylor rule approach needs much larger samples (twenty years
or so). The use of daily data enables the RS approach to discover interesting sub-
sample dynamics, as shown in the preceding sections. Using Taylor rules we could
not detect with precision the decline in reaction observed in the last ten years and
we could not estimate the model for such small samples as the boom and bust
cycles at the end of the 1990s.
Using a combination of short-run and long-run restrictions in a VAR, Bjłrnland
and Leitemo (2008) ￿nd a large interest rate response on the impact of a stock
market shock. According to their estimates, a 10% increase in stock prices would
lead to an increase in the interest rate of 40 basis point over the period 1983-
2002. This value is double than ours. Interestingly, changing the sample period,
Bjłrnland and Leitemo (2008) also ￿nd a decline in the response over time.
A recent study which also exploits heteroskedasticity is D￿ Agostino, Sala and
Surico (2005). They ￿nd nonlinearities in the Federal Reserve response to as-
set prices over the period 1985-2003. Estimating a Threshold VAR (TVAR) on
monthly data with two regimes (high and low ￿nancial volatility), they ￿nd a
non-signi￿cant reaction in periods of low ￿nancial volatility and a positive and
signi￿cant reaction in periods of high ￿nancial volatility with the point estimate
at 0.037. In their sample average stock returns are -0.9% in the high volatility
regime and 1.8 in the low volatility regime Consequently, they empathize that the
Federal Reserve reaction is asymmetric and signi￿cant only in the downturn phase
of stock market cycles. At ￿rst glance, their results are di⁄erent from ours. We do
not ￿nd this non-linear reaction for stock prices (see as an example table 6 for a
recent boom-bust cycle) whereas we identify a similar e⁄ect for house prices (see
table 9).
256 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to measure the reaction of monetary policy to asset
prices in the four major world economies. The main results can be summarized as
follows:
1) We ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant reaction in the US and the UK (but only
up to the late 1990s). Our result is of the same order of magnitude as the ￿ndings
in RS (2003) and Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004).
2) We ￿nd that the reaction of the Federal Reserve is much lower in the period
1996-2006, although the reaction is still positive and signi￿cant. In the same
period, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan
do not react at all to asset prices.
3) We explain the reduced response by the Federal Reserve in the second part
of the sample as a result of more attention being paid to house prices than to
stock prices. We showed that the reaction to house prices has increased over time
whereas the response to stock prices has decreased over time. A more important
role for house prices is consistent with speeches by Greenspan (2001) and empirical
evidence provided by Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) among many others.
4) This paper reconciles results in the Taylor rule literature and in the identi-
￿cation through heteroskedasticity literature. However, we show that only the RS
approach can discover short-term dynamics that are essential in the interpretation
of the results.
An interesting extension of this paper would be the estimation of the interest
rate response to the stock market in a model with time-varying parameters. We
plan to work on this project in the future.
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Figure 1: Thirty-day rolling standard deviation of daily changes in the interest
rate (STDEVINT), of daily changes in the stock market index (STDEVSP) and
rolling correlation of daily changes of the interest rate and the stock market index
(CORRUSA).
Appendix A
Table A1: Estimates for the US, 1985-1995
Regimes all Regimes all
lim=1 macro shocks
Mean of distribution 0.0159 0.0224
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0303 0.0058
Mass below zero 13.5% 0.1%
Table A2: Estimates for the US, 1996-2006
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
lim=0.5 lim=1.5 macro shocks
Mean of distribution 0.0063 0.0062 0.0064
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0026 0.0027 0.0020
Mass below zero 0.6% 0.7% 0%
30Table A3: Estimates for the UK, 1985-1995
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
lim=0.5 lim=1 macro shocks
Mean of distribution 0.0086 0.0106 0.0135
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0071 0.0072 0.0451
Mass below zero 10.7% 6.8% 0.5%
Table A4: Estimates for the UK, 1996-2006
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
lim=0.5 lim=1.5 macro shocks
Mean of distribution -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0001
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0008 0.0016 0.0008
Mass below zero 86% 66.7% 55.5%
Table A5: Estimates for the EU, 1999-2006
Regimes all Regimes all Regimes all
lim=0.5 lim=1.5 macro shocks
Mean of distribution 0.0006 -0.0031 0.0023
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0006 0.0005 0.0402
Mass below zero 12.7% 18.6% 25.4%
Table A6: Reaction to Real Estate Index (REIT) using all regimes
UK EU
(1996-2006) (1999-2006)
Mean of distribution -0.0006 -0.0014
Std. dev. of distribution 0.0010 0.0020
Mass below zero 71.6% 75.7%
31Appendix B
In this appendix, we show how to estimate ￿ using three regimes. First, we
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￿+￿ . From the two estimated covariance matrices above we can write
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which is a system of two equations in two unknowns (￿;￿). Solving this system,
we ￿nd an estimate for ￿, the parameter of interest, and an estimate for ￿ combin-
ing ￿;￿ and ￿ (this is the reason why we achieve only partial identi￿cation). RS
(2003) choose the root using the following criterion. If the two roots have di⁄erent
signs, they select the positive one. If they have the same sign, they choose the
smaller in absolute value. From a theoretical point of view, we expect ￿ to be
small and positive but we do not have a prior for 1
￿ =
￿+￿
1+￿￿. As a guide, we can
choose the GMM estimate that is 0.018 for ￿ and -0,9090 for ￿ for the US. Thus,
it is reasonable that if we ￿nd only one positive root this has to be ￿ and that if
the two roots have the same sign ￿ is the smaller one, otherwise our model would
be completely misspeci￿ed.
We used the RS selection criterion for Japan, the UK and the EU but we
found very di⁄erent estimates in each subset of regimes with big standard errors.
The model seemed to be completely misspeci￿ed. We modi￿ed the regimes and
estimated the model for di⁄erent samples, but the problem was always present. It
turned out that the procedure for the selection of the roots was not e¢ cient and
thus we modi￿ed it to pick up correctly ￿ and not 1
￿. We chose the root that was
lower in absolute value and thus in case of di⁄erent signs we did not force ￿ to
be positive as RS (2003). This slight modi￿cation did not change the results in
the RS sample but matters a lot for the other countries and the other samples. In
that way, we are able to select the correct root most of the time.
Substituting (2) in (3); we have the following quadratic equation in ￿:
a￿
2 ￿ b￿ + c = 0
where:
33a = ￿￿31;22￿￿21;12 ￿ ￿￿21;22￿￿31;12
b = ￿￿31;22￿￿21;11 ￿ ￿￿21;22￿￿31;11
c = ￿￿31;12￿￿21;11 ￿ ￿￿21;12￿￿31;11
The quadratic equation always has a real solution and after some tedious alge-
bra we can rewrite it in the following way
(1 + ￿￿)d￿



































Hence, we are able to estimate consistently ￿ as long as we choose the right
solution of the quadratic form and we have at least three regimes for the covariance
matrix.
With four regimes, the model is overidenti￿ed and the parameters can be esti-












In table C1, we observe that the covariance, which on average is slightly nega-
tive, becomes positive when the stock market shock exhibits high variance. These
shifts in the covariance matrix enable us to identify the model using the estimated
covariance matrices to recover the parameters of the structural form. In table C1,
we show the estimates of the four covariance matrices ￿i for i = 1 to 4.
Table C1: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk Mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.2220 70.8844 -0.3434 91.2%
Regime 2 0.4550 363.7233 4.8330 1.8%
Regime 3 2.1157 991.9111 14.3440 2.3%
Regime 4 0.9828 72.9241 -1.0091 4.7%
The four estimates obtained using three regimes can be compared to a GMM
estimate that uses all four regimes. With four regimes, the model is overidenti￿ed.
We test that the four estimates using three regimes are statistically equal to the
GMM estimate by computing the di⁄erence between the estimates for each draw
of the bootstrap. We obtain 1000 observations that represent the distribution
of the di⁄erence in the estimates. This distribution should have zero mean and
obviously zero should be inside the 95% con￿dence interval for the mean. Using
the language of RS, we call this test ￿ test of overidentifying restrictions￿ . Over
the period 1985-1999, the test is passed in each case, as is shown in table C2:

















￿234 [-0.0169, 0.0180] 0.0008
We present below the same tables for the other estimates.
The US: 1985-2006

















￿234 [0.0000, 0.0247] 0.0118
The US: 1985-1995
Table C4: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.2388 61.24 -0.33 86.7%
Regime 2 0.0653 44.45 0.36 0.7%
Regime 3 1.6679 959.74 14.53 3.2%
Regime 4 0.8582 58.55 -2.01 9.5%

















￿234 [-0.0084, 0.0028] -0.0025
The US: 1996-2006
Table C6: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.1033 93.23 0.11 84.2%
Regime 2 0.2023 398.65 2.10 9%
Regime 3 0.9209 189.30 1.52 3.2%
Regime 4 1.0289 139.93 0.72 3.6%

















￿234 [-0.0650, 0.0595] 0.0034
37The UK: 1985-1995
Table C8: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.8331 62.71 -0.73 87.8%
Regime 2 2.3197 1375.31 18.76 1.3%
Regime 3 3.3478 236.08 -1.73 2.4%
Regime 4 5.7884 52.71 -3.72 8.5%

















￿234 [-0.0505, 0.0246] -0.014
The UK: 1996-2006
Table C10: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.0779 86.09 -0.00 80.7%
Regime 2 0.0447 494.29 -0.09 7.1%
Regime 3 0.7679 201.86 0.57 2.7%
Regime 4 0.6388 110.8 0.63 9.5%

















￿234 [-0.0608, 0.0538] -0.0029
The EU: 1999-2006
Table C12: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Reduced Form Shocks
Variance of Variance of Frequency
Policy Shocks Stk mkt shocks Covariance of Obs.
Regime 1 0.0194 122.21 0.0695 83.3%
Regime 2 0.0212 597.88 0.3278 8.4%
Regime 3 0.4094 457.61 1.9612 1.7%
Regime 4 0.2576 77.41 -0.3623 6.5%

















￿234 [-0.0080, 0.0238] 0.0064
39Japan 1991-1996

















￿234 [-0.0281, 0.0073] -0.0087
40